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Introduction 
The study of EU governing, how it operates and whom contributes to it, is essential to our 
understanding of the functioning of this political system. This is particularly true in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which deeply challenged existing forms of decision-
making and redistribution mechanisms (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). Possibly, the EU has 
never been so effective in imposing decisions on member states and societies. And in this 
critical context, the long-term structuring impact of the policy tools and modes of governance 
that had been introduced in order to define a new approach to governance were made visible. 
By exploring this initial assumption both theoretically and empirically, this special issue sheds 
new light on current debates regarding the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on EU 
governing. Following the 2001 White book on governance, a series of new modes of 
governance and policy tools have been designed and implemented across EU policy domains 
in order to address simultaneously the problem-solving capacity of EU institutions and the 
need to strengthen the participation of civil society (Heritier and Rhodes, 2011). Managerial 
reforms within the EU Commission and policies justified the need for softer modes of 
governance such as regulatory networks, benchmarking and tools through which policy and 
state performance could be measured and compared. By providing more participative and 
negotiated ways of decision-making, these softer modes of governance increased the political 
and administrative governability of the EU (Radaelli and Coletti, 2013), yet which actors and 
organizations benefited most from this new governance approach as well as its contribution to 
increasing the system’s political accountability and democratic legitimacy remains a contested 
issue (Bellamy et al., 2011). The supposed superiority of new modes of governance – in terms 
of both inclusiveness and effectiveness – has been hotly debated in the EU literature. 
Following the changes brought since the 2008 crisis to the socio-economic and the fiscal 
governance regimes, these softer modes of governance have developed into harder, more 
coercive forms of decision-making, thus justifying the need to re-examine the ‘softening 
narrative’, which dominated academic and practitioners’ debates about the EU governing over 
the past fifteen years.  
Far from reopening classic debates on EU modes of governance, this proposed special issue 
uses the governance notion as an organizing concept in order to examine the governing of the 
EU in times of crisis. More specifically, we argue that focusing on modes of governance 
contributes to the understanding of “where the power lies in the EU system” especially when 
an external shock – such as the crisis – hits the EU governance system. In our analysis, 
looking at “power” implies looking at influence, i.e. the capacity of actors to obtain decisions 
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which are in line with their specific preferences. This introductory article highlights some of 
the aspects that we consider have been at the heart of the new political challenges to the EU in 
terms of governance. But before we turn to the discussion of such traits, we will briefly situate 
our analysis in the broader (and ‘classic’) spectrum of the studies on European integration.  
 
The debate on EU integration: New challenges  
 
Scholars of European integration have always been interested in how the European political 
organisation was governed. Since the early debates between neofunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists, one of the main key research questions was – to put it simply – who 
was governing what today has become the European Union. Was decision-making primarily 
in the hands of a supranational body (the European Commission alone first, in combination 
with the European Parliament later) or in the governmental representatives formally in 
command European decision making? Although decades have passed since the first studies 
were conducted, the research question remains crucial in order to assess power relations 
within the EU.  
More recently, this question has been explored through different perspectives (Saurugger, 
2014). This large body of literature progressively shifted from a research question on the 
nature of the European Union (What is the EU?) to questions regarding the way through 
which integration occurred (How does EU integration evolves?), thus increasingly focusing 
on the functioning and the governing of the EU understood as a hybrid political system (Benz 
and Dose, 2010; Kohler Koch and Rittberger, 2006). Drawing on extensive theoretical and 
empirical findings, the existing work has supported the need for new conceptualization or the 
relevance of traditional political analysis tools (political science, comparative politics). By 
looking more closely at the dynamics of EU integration, these studies hoped to deepen their 
understanding of the EU as a political system, seen primarily as an outcome that needed 
further characterization. In other words, exploring EU integration process was and still is 
another way to ask whether or not EU institutions, as a governing body and rule-making 
authority, have benefited or not from the accumulation of resources vis-à-vis Member States.  
 
Following the work done by a first generation of EU scholars that focused on the role of law 
and EJC rulings as a main integration factor, a second generation of EU scholars became 
increasingly interested in softer integration modes, understood here as less hierarchical in 
nature but with potential of effectiveness and democratization (Cini and Rhodes, 2007). 
OXPO - Oxford Sciences Po Research group - http://oxpo.politics.ox.ac.uk 
 
4 
 
Indeed, and in connection with the evolution and expansion of the European Union, a new 
wave of studies focussing on ‘new modes of governance’ has tried to look even more deeply 
into such topic by examining alternative and innovative ways of decision-making in the 
European Union. For example, one of the most explored ‘new modes of governance’ has 
focused on sectoral governance where a limited space (‘the shadow of hierarchy’) has been 
left for public institutions, be they intergovernmental settings or supranational ones (Héritier 
and Lehmkuhl, 2008). More in general, the ‘new modes of governance’ literature has 
highlighted – to some degree following the neoinstitutionalist turn in European studies 
(Pierson, 1998) – the fact that governance settings are much more relevant than discussed 
both in the intergovernmentalist and in the neofunctionalist perspective in understanding who 
are the major actors in EU decision-making. We could also add that understanding the ‘new 
modes of governance’ requires to take into consideration the changes introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty (2009), especially with reference to the increased co-decision powers for the 
European Parliament (for a critical assessment, see Hosli et al, 2013; Burns et al, 2013; Lord, 
2013).  
 
Beyond the assessment of the institutional balances, the new modes of governance literature 
has also tried to focus on the analysis of emerging forms of self-regulation (Heritier and 
Lehmkuhl, 2008; 2011) and greater involvement of citizens in EU decision-making, often 
however not reaching conclusive findings, focusing therefore more on the notion on 
innovativeness rather than inclusiveness (Kröger, 2009). Furthermore, the ‘new modes of 
governance’ literature focused on specific policy tools and instruments. They mapped out the 
way in which, since the early 1990s, the governing of the EU had been characterised by a 
growing diversity in forms of policy-making. More specifically, after a decade of innovations 
and new policy developments, from a political perspective the introduction of new types of 
‘modes of governance’ aimed at both rationalising public policies and democratising forms of 
policy-making has become a central issue in EU policy-making (Jordan and Schout, 2006). 
Extensive work was done on a series of meta-instruments of coordination, in the sense given 
by Hood (2007), whose introduction aimed at increasing coordination when other 
mechanisms had failed. Such tools (e.g., organization charts, framework agreements, Open 
Method of Coordination, the Bologna process, sectoral governance instruments, etc.), which 
are characterised by their non-hierarchical nature, seek direct involvement from a large 
variety of social groups and provide – at least in principle – new political opportunities for EU 
institutions.  
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Summing up, the main focus of the literature on the ‘new modes of governance’ (Dehousse, 
2004; Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004; Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006; Treib et al, 2007; Cini 
and Rhodes, 2007; Kröger, 2009; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008 & 2011) has been threefold: a) 
providing a conceptual and theoretical clarification; b) setting the links between the ‘new 
modes of governance’ and political authority; c) assessing the operational and delegation 
features of the ‘new modes of governance’.  
 
Nevertheless, although increasing, the ‘new modes of governance’ literature has recently 
shown signs of ‘fatigue’, due to the difficulty to grasp analytically the ever changing nature of 
processes such as the OMC and (post-)Lisbon Strategy (such as Europe 2020) and to the 
persistence of key features of the ‘old’ Community Method in current EU forms of 
governance. Furthermore, scholarly work also showed how such political opportunities have 
not always increased the coordination capacity of European institutions (again, in primis the 
European Commission), nor has the decision-making process been effectively more open with 
respect to civil society (Saurugger, 2014).  
 
Notwithstanding the existing important contributions on the ‘new modes of governance’, what 
seems to be still lacking in the academic debates is a comprehensive analysis regarding broad 
political dimension, more specifically the inclusiveness and effectiveness dimensions, of such 
modes of governance. We understand the notion of political dimension as the ability of EU 
institutions to act as legitimate authorities in effectively regulating activities and groups that 
is, to resolve conflicts, allocate resources and organize larger debates on purposes and 
coercion (Kooiman 1993; Benz and Dose, 2010). In other words, we argue that focusing on 
modes of governance, as a meso level of analysis, contributes to the understanding of “where 
the power lies in the EU system”. However, this requires a shift from a highly contextualized 
understanding of modes of governance that was grounded in the somewhat normative and 
academic debates regarding the innovative dimension of modes of governance (Bellamy and 
Castiglione, 2003; 2013; Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007; Bellamy, 2011), towards a more 
analytic understanding of the notion, which needs to be grounded into specific subdimensions 
such as inclusiveness and effectiveness. In other words and following Treib et al (2007, 2) we 
suggest abandoning the novelty dimension in order to focus on the more narrow political 
dimensions of new modes of governance. Indeed, the debate between ‘old’ and ‘new’ has 
little analytic value. Similarly, we reject the narrative according to which there is a growing 
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tendency to introduce soft modes of governance that is, non hierarchical rules and norms, as 
opposed to classic modes of governance. Rather, we assume the continuous blurring between 
hard and soft, in which imposition and direct decision-making softens increasingly, while soft 
modes of governance, such as persuasion, naming shaming, incentives etc. become harder and 
prove more or less innovative and effective under specific circumstances. To be sure, this 
does not lead us to discard completely the question of how different ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ modes 
of governance may be, but simply we focus rather on the everlasting coexistence of these 
modes and focus on the political dimension of governance in terms of inclusiveness and 
effectiveness. While we share the idea raised by Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) that innovation in 
EU governance lays the combination of existing policy tools and instruments, we do however, 
question their pragmatist approach to power as diffuse and dynamic. Exploring the political 
dimension of governance in terms of both inclusiveness and exclusiveness contributes to the 
understanding of where the power lies in the EU system. To be sure, conceptually 
effectiveness and inclusiveness can be strongly related (depending on the definitions, see 
below), but empirically the two notions may be decoupled or very loosely coupled. In other 
words, we posit that – although often coupled also in the political discourses of EU 
institutions – inclusiveness and effectiveness may be quite different in reality. And for this 
reason, we leave the question of their relationship open and asked the authors of the various 
contributions to this special issue to answer it.  
 
Finally, we are less interested in the design of such tools than in their implementation and 
long-term effects in terms of both democratization and rationalization. More specifically, we 
believe that a greater understanding of the impact of the new forms of governance on 
democratization (specifically in terms of inclusiveness) and rationalization (in terms of 
effectiveness). Indeed, we assume that a shift in the way power is exerted at EU level may 
have a specific impact on EU integration process and EU governing in terms of providing 
legitimation, inclusiveness and effectiveness. 
 
The Crisis and Its Challenges to EU Governance 
 
Our main hypothesis is that the 2008 crisis has offered a new opportunity for the 
intergovernmental mode of decision-making to prevail, left marginal space for further 
including citizens in decision-making processes and has provided a very narrow definition of 
effectiveness (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). This has been made possible by the increasing 
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predominance of economic multi-level governance, which has increasingly shaped the 
relationship of almost all other European policies and measures. Additional support in favour 
of such policy and instrumentation choices was justified in the name of austerity understood 
as both a set of policies and an ideology (Blyth, 2013; see also CEP symposium, 2013). To 
begin with, from a legal perspective, in analysing reforms to EU law and institutional 
structure – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European 
Council and the creation of a stand-alone Fiscal Compact – it can be argued that such reforms 
“are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in 
all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to 
dampen the long-term stability and legitimacy of the EU project”  (Dawson and de Witte, 
2013). Clearly, legal analysis must be also tested by empirical research, but we argue that as a 
starting point there is legalistic evidence concerning a broad reorientation of EU decision-
making more in line with an accentuation of the powers of (some) Member States on 
European supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. As a result, we believe this change of context calls for a re-examination of forms 
of governing in the EU, and more specifically the so-called “softening narrative”, in order to 
go beyond a mere distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law and focus more on the governing 
processes which are in place in various institutional and policy areas.  
 
For such purpose, we suggest to introduce an analytic distinction between three following 
notions: policy tools or instruments, modes of governance, and regimes of governance. This 
will help us deepen our ability to highlight the typical properties of governing modes at EU 
level rather than refer to their first introduction in a specific empirical context and therefore 
understand broader regularities of such governing modes beyond the their empirical 
specification (Howlett, 2011, 54). More specifically, we define the three notions as follow: 
1. Policy tools or instruments can be defined as a set of governing techniques (budgets, 
practices, norms and standards) that are often dissociated from the political game. Yet, 
the rationales at work in the choice and selection of the concrete modalities through 
which policy objectives are made operational, like other processes of implementation 
or evaluation, are deeply political both in their elaboration and in their effects 
(Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007). In this special issue we focus on the effects of policy 
tools understood in terms of both inclusiveness and effectiveness.  
2. Modes of governance refer to the way through which different types of policy 
instruments – often pertaining to both binding, sanctioning tools and persuasive, 
OXPO - Oxford Sciences Po Research group - http://oxpo.politics.ox.ac.uk 
 
8 
 
informative tools – are combined with one another at EU level in order to both 
constraint and enable collective action and the setting of common goals. By narrowing 
the definition of modes of governance to the interplay of policy instruments, we go 
beyond the static view of hard versus soft law and try to test whether there has been 
convergence (or not) through policy areas in terms of instrument combination and/or 
their outcome in terms of inclusiveness and effectiveness.  
3. Regime of governance, understood as a set of arrangements that ensures power 
allocation among EU institutions and Member States. This notion helps us 
characterizing the EU political ability to produce a basic form of social order (Mayntz, 
2003), by effectively regulating activities and groups according to evolving 
relationships between EU institutions and member states on the one hand, and between 
public and private actors on the other hand (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999; Benz and 
Papadopoulos, 2006). In other words, we ask where the power lies in the EU system, 
by focusing on the way through which groups and activities are politically regulated 
(or not). More specifically, by focusing on the inclusiveness and effectiveness 
dimensions, we are interested in both the governing and the governability of the EU 
(Kassim and Le Galès, 2010).  
 
We believe that this special issue provides a comprehensive analysis of why and how the 
continuous blurring between hard and soft shapes the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of 
EU forms of governance. Indeed, the context of the crisis has further put under pressure the 
existing modes of governance by requiring more tight supranational control over EU policy 
implementation (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Crespy and Ravinet, forthcoming). Policy tools 
aiming at rationalizing public policies, investments and programmes (i.e., impact assessment, 
better governance, etc.) have been systematically introduced (Coletti and Radaelli, 2013). 
They contribute over time to reorganizing the functioning of the EU both substantially and 
procedurally. Recent negotiations on the next programming period (2014-2020), and the 
setting of policy priorities in preparation of Europe 2020, show how such rationalizing policy 
instruments shape evolving relationships in the EU, both vertically and horizontally. Indeed, 
the papers gathered in this special issue illustrate the constant interplay between hard and soft, 
rather than opposition between two clearly demarcated approaches to exerting power and 
constraint. In a large number of policy areas, new modes of governance are increasingly used 
in close combination with traditional “harder” modes of governance. The recourse to 
sanctioning and disciplining takes over another major priority, namely to further democratize 
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the EU policy. This process does not rely on the introduction of new policy instruments as 
such, but rather it shows how the systematic combination between old and new modes of 
governance creates additional opportunities for intergovernmentalist tendencies.  
 
Such phenomenon has wider implications for the understanding of EU integration, as 
suggested by the intertwining of three mechanisms through which power is exerted: first the 
recourse to hard mechanisms, such as sanction and norms, that are imposed through direct 
decision-making; second the use of softer mechanisms that prove more effective in some 
cases in order to persuade and convince actors to comply with given rules and norms; and 
third, learning as a major mechanism of power that shapes evolving relationships between EU 
institutions and member states. In the following sections of this article, we situate the special 
issue by focussing on the challenges on the ongoing relevance – even more so in the wake of 
the economic and financial crisis – of the neglected dimensions of the ‘new modes of 
governance’ literature: inclusiveness and effectiveness. 
 
Inclusiveness  
Together with the effectiveness dimension, inclusiveness has traditionally been a concern for 
both EU policy-makers and scholars (Metz, 2014). More specifically, due to the specific and 
quite unique setting of the EU multilevel political system, the aim of an inclusive EU has been 
on the political agenda at least since the introduction of direct election of the European 
Parliament (1979) and even more relevant after Maastricht (Kröger and Friedrich, 2013). 
Together with the European Parliament, the European Commission has increasingly been 
concerned with inclusiveness issues, as the White Paper on European Governance (2001) 
clearly stated:  “Today, political leaders throughout Europe are facing a real paradox. On the 
one hand, Europeans want them to find solutions to the major problems confronting our 
societies. On the other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply 
not interested in them. The problem is acknowledged by national parliaments and 
governments alike. It is particularly acute at the level of the European Union. Many people 
are losing confidence in a poorly understood and complex system to deliver the policies that 
they want. The Union is often seen as remote and at the same time too intrusive.” (European 
Commission, 2001: 3). The European Commission identified five key areas (of principles of 
‘good governance’), which would have contributed to solving the ‘loss of confidence’ in EU 
institutions: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. In policy 
terms, the following decade has been a period which has been labeled as a ‘participatory turn’ 
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(Saurugger, 2010) which was characterized by the fact that EU decision-making had to be 
more accessible to civil society and be only secluded to institutional relationships (Saurugger, 
2010: 483).  
 
Even prior to the empirical analysis of inclusiveness, what seems to be lacking to the overall 
debate regarding the inclusiveness of EU decision making, however, is a clear distinction 
between types of inclusion. For example, scholars like Koenig and Bräuninger (1999) have 
been primarily interested in the inclusion of institutional actors such as the European 
Parliament, whereas others have focused on the inclusion of non-institutional actors such as 
civil society representatives (Saurugger, 2010; Quittkat, 2011). Overall, the empirical 
evidence shows that – although increasing inclusiveness has occurred formally – in more 
substantial terms the picture is more much nuanced. 
In order to better focus on the inclusiveness dimensions, we suggest that a clear distinction 
among types of inclusion must be made. Such a distinction would allow us to better 
understand differences between formal (in its two variants, institutional and non-institutional) 
and substantive inclusiveness. Institutional formal inclusiveness regards the openness of 
institutional decision-making. The key actors are EU decision-making institutions that is, the 
Council of European Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
Beyond neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist accounts of European integration, there is 
sufficient shared consensus that EU decision-making has increasingly been open via the 
transformation of the European Parliament as a full co-legislator: in the words of Rittberger, 
“[b]estowed with only a few nominal powers at the outset, the EP has undergone a remarkable 
process of institutional empowerment” (Rittberger, 2012: 18). This empowerment may not 
make the European Parliament fully equal to the Council of European Ministers (Costello and 
Thompson, 2013) but still it signals a changing power balance within the institutional 
functioning of the EU. Put differently, in institutional terms the inclusiveness of the EU has 
clearly gone a long way in the development of European integration – even though the crisis 
seems to have boosted intergovernmental power within most recent patterns of EU decision-
making. From the civil society (i.e. formal non-institutional), inclusiveness has also increased 
significantly over the past decade although we should be aware of the fact that “discursive 
agreement [on the inclusion of civil society] does not entail that there exists a homogenous 
entity that one could label ‘civil society’, or that the principle of the participative standard is 
universally applied” (Saurugger, 2010: 489). For these and other caveats which will be 
derived from the empirical findings presented in this special issue, we would claim that 
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formal (or procedural) inclusiveness has been granted over the past decade to civil society 
organizations that is, to well-organized and –established organizations that claim to act in the 
name and in the interest of society as opposed to citizen themselves (Kohler-Koch, 2008; see 
also Boussaguet in this special issue).  
This feature seems to be even more true due in the light of the European governance of the 
crisis which has offered greater opportunities for intergovernmentalist decision-making 
(Dawson and de Witte, 2013) and, consequently, limited the space of intervention for both 
supranational institutions and civil society actors. Less evidence can be found of a substantive 
(and generalized) empowerment of civil society – although some recent data has cast some 
doubts on the more conventional interpretation that business interests are stronger than 
collective interests (Dür and others, 2013). Also the case studies presented in this special issue 
provide interesting evidence that substantive inclusiveness has been particularly limited since 
– as in the case of the OMC – procedural participation has expanded the most. Put differently, 
the ‘participatory turn’ of EU governance seems to be better applied to formal inclusiveness 
rather than to substantive inclusiveness. And, as the articles in this special issue show, the 
responses to the crisis further limited the reach of inclusion – reducing also formal (both 
institutional and non-institutional) inclusiveness. 
 
Effectiveness 
Since the White Paper on Governance, also effectiveness has been a key word within the 
redefinition of the European institutions’ role in the EU multilevel political system. More 
specifically, the effectiveness dimension represented a key feature of the so-called ‘output 
legitimacy’ or ‘output democracy’ model which, according to some authors (Scharpf, 1999), 
characterizes the European Union. But where lies the effectiveness problem within the EU? In 
principle, we should distinguish between two types of effectiveness: policy effectiveness and 
political effectiveness. The first type of effectiveness is linked to the need that the policies 
designed, adopted and implemented at the EU level are effective in the sense that they are (at 
least) producing the expected results; the second, broader type of effectiveness is linked to the 
legitimacy needs of the EU multilevel political system, following the understanding that EU 
institutions will be politically effective when the overall support (‘legitimacy’) within the 
affected political community is favourable. More specifically, with respect to policy 
effectiveness, the European institutions, and the European Commission in particular, have the 
task to cover 28 member states and oversee policy formulation and implementation, which is 
applied to over 500 million EU citizens. As Metz rightly notices, “[o]ften policy makers do 
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not possess sufficient in-house expertise to formulate adequate problem solutions (...). [T]his 
(...) is particularly pronounced in the European Union, where governing institutions are both 
highly understaffed and geographically detached from domestic settings to which EU 
regulation applies” (Metz, 2014: 263). EU institutions tried to mobilize external expertise in 
order to fill knowledge gaps, and this resulted in the so called ‘committee system’ (with over 
1,000 expert groups assembling more than 30,000 experts, advising especially the less-than-
23,000 staff of the European Commission (Metz, 2014: 264). However, the role of experts is 
ambiguous in terms of potential power unbalances since they may – at least in theory – be 
strategically used by the Commission (Rimkuté and Haverland, 2013) or some experts may 
systematically prevail over others (Metz, 2014). To be sure, this ambiguity regards rather the 
nature of inclusiveness and openness of EU decision-making and not the capacity to reach the 
fixed policy goals.  
Therefore, we shall focus on the latter, knowing that a general analysis of EU policy-making 
is out of the reach of this contribution. For our purposes, it should suffice to say that policy 
effectiveness depends heavily on the policy sector – and both horizontal and vertical power 
relations within that sector – and over the past years policy effectiveness concerns have been 
particularly relevant in terms of responding to the economic crisis via the tightening of 
domestic budgetary constraints rather than fixing more ambitious goals in other policy areas – 
such as social policy. Put differently, policy effectiveness has overridden the search for 
political effectiveness, especially in a context of austerity during which the increased 
shrinking of public authorities’ discretionary power further restrain their redistributive 
capacity (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013).  
 
Although we shall see in the various contributions to this special issue how policy 
effectiveness has varied, we consider political effectiveness more relevant since it regards the 
political system as such and does not merely pertain to specific policy sectors. With this 
respect, the systemic attempt to obtain ‘output legitimacy’ in an overall context characterized 
by limited ‘input legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 1999) seems to be even more salient since it can tell us 
something about how European integration is perceived by the potential beneficiaries of its 
overall functioning – the members of the EU political community –, beyond specific policy 
sectors of which large parts of the populations may not even be aware of. Furthermore, 
‘system effectiveness’ has been a greater concern for scholars of democracy beyond the EU 
(Dahl, 1994), providing stronger scientific legitimacy to our selective choice. It allows linking 
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the debate on spaces of modes of governance together with a larger debate on the EU 
integration process.   
 
In order to measure the political effectiveness of the EU we consider two indicators as 
particularly relevant: voter turnout and trust in the EU (as measured by the standard 
Eurobarometer questionnaire). The first is a crude indicator of how important EU institutions 
are perceived, the second is a less crude indicator of the levels of trust in EU institutions. We 
are well aware of the relative inaccuracy of the indicators, but for the moment no valid 
alternative of ‘system’ or political effectiveness operationalization seems to be in sight. In 
terms of voter turnout, the trend has been increasingly negative: from 62% in 1979 to 43% in 
2009. Breaking down the data, it is even more striking that with the exception of Latvia and 
Estonia all the other new Central-Eastern members underperformed with respect to the EU 
average – and after the crisis exploded voter turnout has diminished also in ‘old’ member 
states. If we turn to the level of trust, the past ten years have witnessed a rapid decline in the 
overall trust – from 42% or EU citizens who ‘tend(ed) to trust’ EU institutions in 2003 to 29% 
in 2013, and from 42% who ‘tend(ed) not to trust’ to 58% in 2013 (See Eurobarometers, 
2013). Also in this case, after the crisis exploded trust has further declines – although causal 
links are difficult to pin down in general terms (whereas for more specific policy-based 
accounts, see the various contribution to this special issue) 
 
Clearly, we are not supporting any causal inference nor are we trying to link policy 
effectiveness and political effectiveness, but for the purposes of our discussion on the missing 
(or underdeveloped) dimensions of analysis with respect to the governance debate we think 
that these data are more than evocative. In other terms, we consider that a systematic 
consideration of the effectiveness dimension – and not primarily the policy dimension but 
rather the political one – needs to be assessed when EU governance is scrutinized. In the 
various articles of the special issue we will deal more specifically with policy effectiveness, 
but in this introductory article we wanted to devote specific attention to the importance of 
‘system’ or ‘political’ effectiveness as a crucial yardstick which allows us to better understand 
how the past decade has changed the relationship between the governance actors (especially 
EU institutions) and the potential beneficiaries of their activity (the members of the EU 
political community). Notwithstanding the ‘new modes of governance’, ‘system 
effectiveness’ has significantly declined over the past decade.  
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The governance mix: overview of the findings presented in the special issue.  
 
By bringing together scholars currently conducting research on different dimensions of EU 
governance, this special issue examines the evolving role of modes of governance in shaping 
the governing of the EU and the mechanism through which power is exerted at EU level. We 
focus more specifically on the challenges that the crisis has posed to both the neglected 
dimensions of the ‘new modes of governance’ literature: inclusiveness and effectiveness. The 
findings of the case studies are considered in the following section in relation to the sets of 
questions outlined above. Although it is not possible to pursue all the lines of inquiry 
suggested, the cases offer many important insights.  
 
Going beyond the softening narrative offers new understandings of the EU and the way 
through which mixed, multi-faceted forms of governance have emerged over time and more 
particularly following the crisis. In several instances, the contributors assembled here 
challenge accepted wisdoms in the existing literature. Dehousse and Falkner, demonstrate the 
weak explanatory role of the softening narrative in order to highlight shifts of power in the 
EU. Not only do they empirically demonstrate the continued blurring between “hard” and 
“soft”, but they also suggest to focus more on existing governing processes in order to map 
out their restructuring in a context of crisis. In its discussion of recent evidence from EU 
legislative activity, Dehousse critically re-examines the shift to “new governance”. He shows 
that in strategic areas such as economic policy coordination or banking regulation, the 
severity of the financial crisis has resulted in a tightening of European rules and in stronger 
control mechanisms. Similarly, Falkner shows how the recent introduction of fines as a new 
policy tool of EU law enforcement against member States results in weakening the softening 
and the ‘innovativeness’ narratives.  
 
Going beyond an understanding of resistances as forms of non-compliance, Saurugger and 
Terpan provide further evidence on the continued blurring between hard and soft law. They 
argue that resistances to soft law is as frequent as that to hard law – even if less empirically 
observable – thus confirming the policy effectiveness of soft law and the profound changes in 
governance structures and power allocation it may lead to over time. Interestingly, they make 
the case that increasing resistances to EU law should not be understood in terms of un-
governability but rather as a proof of its growing normalization and acceptance as an effective 
rule-making authority.  
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Another finding shared by many of the contributors is that shifts of power in the EU are by no 
means unidirectional. This has major implications for the literature on the effectiveness of EU 
governance. It also contributes to current debates about if and how the EU Commission has 
been a beneficiary of the crisis (Bickerton, Puetter and Hodson, 2014). In spite of growing 
anti-European sentiments in the EU and of increasingly assertive governments, the 
strengthening of European rules – sometimes based on the strategic usages of the “soft” 
instruments at its disposal – has enhanced its authority across policy domains (see Dehousse’s 
contribution). This is done by adding hierarchy and increasing the sanctions attached with 
cross-sectoral and cross-national policy performances. In this sense, the systematic use of 
collaborative, non-coercive and informal modes of governance does not just result in the 
weakening of EU institutions and governing capacity. Indeed, standardized measurement 
procedures, detailed surveillance mechanisms and systematic assessment of national / sectoral 
performance strengthen – in theory – the steering capacity of EU institutions over member 
states and societies.  
 
This process is most certainly detrimental to the European and member states Parliaments, but 
whether or not it benefits the European Commission largely varies from one case to the other 
as argued by Falkner. She shows that “the Commission considers the opportunity to combine 
quite different instruments of great importance in its efforts to ensure compliance with EU 
law” (Falkner, in this special issue). Taking a different view on non-compliance to EU law, 
Saurugger and Terpan argue that the effectiveness of soft law is best understood in 
relationship with social - as opposed to legal – sanctions, but proves no less effective in terms 
of the EU’s governing capacity. In the case of financial markets, Kudrna examines how 
evolving forms of governance in the financial market regulation domain led to hardening soft 
modes of governance. Following the 2008 crisis, successive reforms strengthened the role 
played by the EU level, through the continued reinforcing of independent agencies and 
specialized committees. Yet, the process through which “the governance of the financial 
market regulation in general and of banking in particular, evolved from the most generic 
community method to a multi-level process centred around independent agencies” does not 
automatically benefit to EU institutions – the Commission, the Council and the Parliament – 
since these newly created bodies are “better positioned to balance disparate interests than 
either the Commission or national authorities by virtue of combining both national and 
supranational points of view.” (Kudrna, in this special issue). 
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These results highlight the structuring effect of new modes of governance on the EU 
governance regime, both in terms of its inclusiveness and its effectiveness. By favouring 
increased institutional inclusiveness, these processes contribute to enhancing the complexity 
of EU decision-making. They contribute to multiplying the number of veto points and players, 
policy-making arenas and opportunities to resist and circumvent EU norms and rules. Over 
time, the sedimentation of new modes of governance and policy instruments also result in 
shifting policy priorities to the detriment of inclusiveness. This is particularly true in times of 
crisis, during which the functioning of existing modes of governance enhanced the EU’s 
policy effectiveness. This is less true however, with regards to political effectiveness, as these 
findings also confirm the political dimension of instrumentation choices. Indeed, specific 
combinations of policy tools and the ability to seize – or not – the opportunities expected from 
a given mode of governance does not result from an automatic process but it is also shaped by 
politics. As shown by Falkner, in some cases of large-scale and visible non-compliance, soft 
pressurizing maybe more effective than penalization and public shaming.  
 
The findings also hold some implications for the EU governance and democracy. They 
empirically challenge the contribution of new modes of governance, such as impact 
assessments, to redefining the EU governance regime and enhancing the EU’s democratic 
credentials. Some contributions do so by focusing on specific policy instruments and their 
implementation over time, thus confirming the widening gap between increased forms of 
formal (especially institutional) inclusiveness and substantial inclusiveness. Focusing on 
impact assessments as one of the concrete devices through which inclusiveness has been made 
operational at EU level, Bozzini and Smismans explore the usages made by the European 
Commission’s DGs of this mode of governance over time. They highlight different patterns of 
participation, and why and how it was primarily understood by DGs as an opportunity to 
enhance coordination by building intra-institutional relationships as opposed to ensuring 
neutral expertise and increasing input-legitimacy. They first show that DGs tend to include a 
limited amount of actors in impact assessments and the variations observed depend less from 
the density of interest groups in a given policy field than from processes of learning within 
each DG. A related point, made by Boussaguet, concerns the usages that were developed of 
the participatory instruments that were introduced at EU level in order to enhance the 
inclusiveness of the decision-making system. Since the early 2000s, a series of specific policy 
instruments such as citizens conferences, deliberative polls, regular consultations and, last but 
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not least, the European Citizens’ Initiative where introduced in order to include ordinary 
citizen as opposed to the organized civil society. Her findings confirm the little use made of 
such policy instruments by ordinary citizen. Yet she also argues that the impact of such a 
symbolic reform should less be assessed in terms of policy outputs or levels of inclusiveness, 
but rather in terms of their political effectiveness since they demonstrate the EU’s continued 
attempts to engage in a structured dialogue with citizens. Nevertheless, the evidence presented 
by Boussaguet confirms that political effectiveness is still lacking notwithstanding the 
symbolic relevance of the new initiatives aimed at increasing the inclusiveness dimensions. 
 
By contrast, other contributors chose to focus on a specific policy domain and the extent to 
which new modes of governance did contribute – or not – to increasing institutional 
inclusiveness. Examining the case of financial market regulation, Kudrna provides some 
insights on the functioning of new modes of governance and policy instruments in the context 
of the 2008 crisis. He argues that such forms of cooperation prove less effective in these 
extreme circumstances, thus justifying another governance reform that primarily relies on 
expert committees and independent agencies. By opening additional space for policy 
coordination, new modes of governance shaped a continued shift towards a more regulatory 
approach to financial market regulation and the emergence of a multi-level governance 
system in which legitimacy is increasingly constrained by the expansion of technocratic 
policy-making.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The focus on dimensions of inclusiveness and effectiveness brings out dimensions of policy-
making that have hitherto remained hidden and highlights characteristics of the ways through 
which the EU is governed that have been relatively unexplored. The governing of the EU is 
increasingly complex, that characteristic having been considerably increased through the 
sedimentation of successive layers of new policy tools and modes of governance. By opening 
successive space for interests mobilization and representation, they did contribute to 
enhancing the institutional inclusiveness of the governance regime as a whole, as well as to 
the policy effectiveness in some specific cases. However, their effects in terms of substantive 
inclusiveness and political effectiveness appear to be extremely limited. This is particularly 
true since the 2008 crisis, which appears to have led to the hardening of pre-existing sets of 
policy tools and modes of governance as a way to increase coordination. From the analytical 
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point of view, the results presented in this special issue clearly show the limits of the 
narratives that explained new directions in EU governance in terms of their “softening” and of 
a “new governance” approach. These analytic frameworks fail to explain recent changes in 
the EU governance regime, inasmuch as they are unable to explain the hardening of existing 
policy tools and the multiplication of autonomous spaces. Focusing on policy tools, and 
analysing the way they are combined – somewhat uneasily – with one another in relation to 
the notions of inclusiveness and effectiveness properly understood, offers fruitful avenues for 
the understanding of the EU political system, the way and limitations of how it is governed.  
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